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Abstract: This paper compares the popular quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol 
BB84 with the more recent Kak’s three-stage protocol and the latter is shown to be more 
secure. A theoretical representation of an authentication-aided version of Kak’s three-
stage protocol is provided that makes it possible to deal with man-in-the-middle attack. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Although practical quantum computing may be years away, quantum cryptography is 
already a reality and products are out in the market pioneered by firms like Quantique, 
MagiQ Technologies, SmartQuantum and there are research groups working on it at 
corporations like HP, IBM, and Toshiba [2].  
 
Security in software or online applications is generally provided by classical encryption 
algorithms like Diffie-Hellman, El-Gamal, RSA, and ECC [11], but all of these are either 
breakable or subject to cryptanalysis if sufficient technological resources were available. 
In quantum cryptography, on the other hand, it can be proved that Eve (the eavesdropper) 
cannot access information without Alice (sender) and Bob’s (recipient) knowledge. 
 
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard published their BB84 protocol [6], which is now the most 
popular QKD method. BB84 and its variants use quantum bits in one pass and this is 
followed by two additional passes of classical data transmission (that are potential weak 
links). Kak’s protocol [1], on the other hand, uses quantum information transmission in 
all its steps to ensure that there is no weak link in the process. The weakness of the 
classical data links of the BB84 is apparent from the fact that single photons are not easy 
to produce [2], and the duplicate photons can be used by the eavesdropper to reconstruct 
the key. 
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2. Viewing BB84 as a three-stage protocol 
 
 
 
Fig 1. BB84, viewed as a three-stage protocol 
 
Say, Alice and Bob each has two polarizers, with 0/90 degrees (     ) for which              is 1 
and        is considered as 0 and with 45/135 degrees (       ) for which                                 is 1
and         is 0. 
 
BB84 protocol can be viewed as a three-stage protocol as said below: 
 
Step 1: Alice randomly chooses polarizers to generate photons and sends them to Bob. 
Say polarizers chosen by Alice are: 
Say photons sent by Alice are:  
 
    
Step 2: Bob receives those photons with randomly chosen polarizers. 
Photons sent by Alice are: 
Say polarizers chosen by Bob are:     
Bob’s resulting measurement is:  
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Step 3: Alice and Bob matches their bases and discard the data for un-matched polarizers. 
So final measurement should be:     
So the resultant bit representation will be: 0-01-00     
 
The main problem for BB84 is that generating single photon is not easy [2]. In most 
industrial applications weak laser beam is used to send the bits needed for the key. 
Usually the laser pulses generate two or more photons which remain in the same quantum 
state. In a beam-splitting attack Eve could split the beam and use the spilt photon to 
detect the bit and could only let pass the multiple photon beams to Bob. In this way Eve 
can eventually determine all the key bits and also remain undetected.  
 
 
3. The basic idea of quantum key distribution 
 
Say an eavesdropper Eve is trying to intercept the message being transmitted between 
Alice and Bob. Quantum key distribution is effective because of the no-cloning theorem 
[6]. If Eve tries to differentiate between two non-orthogonal states, it is not possible to 
achieve information gain without collapsing the state of at least one of them. 
 
This is clear from considering |ψ  and |ϕ  to be the non-orthogonal quantum states Eve 
is trying to know about. If these states interact with a standard state | u , 
                                                     | | | |u vψ ψ→  
                                                     /| | | |u vϕ ϕ→  
Eve would want | v and /| v  to be different, to know the identity of the state. However 
inner products are preserved under unitary transformations and 
/| | | |v v u uψ ϕ ψ= ϕ     or, /| |v v u u 1= =  
So | and v /|  must be identical and Eve will need to disturb one of the two states in 
order to acquire any information. 
v
X
 
 
 
4. Kak’s three-stage quantum protocol 
 
This protocol can be summarized as follows: 
 
Step 1: Alice applies a unitary transformation U  on quantum information X and sends 
the qubits to Bob. 
A
 
Step 2: Bob applies U  on the received qubits U , which gives U U  and sends it 
back to Alice. 
B A ( )B A
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Step 3: Alice applies †AU (transpose of the complex conjugate of ) on the received 
qubits to get  and sends it back to Bob. 
AU
† †( ) ( ) ( )A B A A B D BU U U X U U U X U X= =
 
Bob then applies  on to get the information X. †BU ( )BU X
 
Here  and  must be commutative to each other, which means 
that . 
AU BU
( ) ( )B A A BU U X U U X=
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2. Kak’s three-stage protocol 
 
With n number of qubits present in the message, the transformations  and  both 
must be of   dimension. It has been observed that the (2 × 2) rotation operator, Pauli-X, 
Pauli-Y and Pauli-Z can be used as commutative transformations in 1-qubit system as all 
of these are 2 × 2 matrices. 
AU BU
2n
 
In order to find transformations for an n-qubits system we can randomly pick any of these 
2×2 matrices and tensor multiply it [7] with another randomly picked one (may be itself) 
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and keep on tensor multiplying for  n times, which will eventually produce a ×  
matrix. The commutativity of the rotation operator can be shown as below: 
2n 2n
                                   
                                        
cos sin
( )
sin cos
R
θ θθ θ θ
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
 
cos sin cos sin cos( ) sin( )
( ). ( ) .
sin cos sin cos sin( ) cos( )
R R
θ θ φ φ θ φ θθ φ φθ θ φ φ θ φ θ φ
− − + −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝
+ ⎞⎟⎠  
 
For a 2-qubit system: 
2
cos sin 0 0
1 0 cos sin sin cos 0 0
( ) *
0 1 sin cos 0 0 cos sin
0 0 sin cos
R
θ θ
θ θ θ θθ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
where “*” denotes tensor product. 
 
Keeping the practical implementations in view information exchange in three-stage 
protocol does not restrict to single photon. Even if the laser pulse produces multiple 
photons and as long as all the photons are in the same phase the transformation and their 
complex conjugate transformation will have same effect on them. So irrespective of how 
many photons are used three-stage protocol is bound to succeed and is not prone to beam-
splitting attack. 
 
But, theoretically, the three-stage protocol can be subjected to the man-in-the-middle 
attack [5]. The next section explains how it can affect functionality of three-stage 
protocol. 
 
 
 
5. Man-in-the-middle attack for three-stage protocol 
 
Man-in-the-middle attack can affect both classical and quantum channels. Here Eve can 
pretend to be Bob to Alice and vice-versa. Instead of  Eve selects  (which is also 
commutative) and fakes a response which looks similar to what Bob would have done. 
Eve pretends as Alice to Bob with the transformation
BU CU
DU , which is commutative to  
BU  and instead of X sends a gibberish Y. So from interaction with Alice he acquires 
value X and sends a junk Y to Bob and hence disables the protocol. 
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Figure 3. Three-stage protocol under Man-in-the-middle attack 
 
 
EPR pairs can be used for a possibly secure three-stage protocol that can avoid man-in-
the-middle attack [9]. But while distributing the EPR pairs, they might get corrupt during 
the transit. So if the EPRs are not matched then the process will be aborted and this might 
cause delay. So in order to ensure security from man-in-the-middle attack and avoid the 
uncertainty regarding EPR pairs this paper proposes a hybrid model that uses classical 
authentication protocols to ensure security in three-stage quantum protocol. 
 
 
6. Description of the classical authentication aided protocol 
 
Here, we use modified version of the protocols proposed by Denning-Sacco [9] and 
Kehne et al [10], as the authentication protocol, alongside the qubits sent in each stage. It 
takes help from a central Key Distribution Center (KDC), which assigns the session key 
and work as the central authority for authentication. 
 
 6
Firstly, as this protocol uses classical bit sequence, we have to transform the bit sequence 
into qubits. A bit sequence of 01101… can be transformed into 0 1 1 0 1 ... , even; to 
increase the amount of reliability we can map 0 and 1 into more than one photon. Now 
what we are doing in each step is that we are sending a series of photon as in usual three-
stage protocol and still using the authentication protocol. Each time Alice or Bob (or the 
KDC) gets the stream of photons; they convert the authentication part to classical 
information, then process it and again transform it into quantum information before 
transmitting. Say, Q (.) is the function used to denote conversion of classical bits to 
quantum qubits.  is also used to get the classical bits inside the Alice, Bob and 
KDC units and are not shown in the protocol. 
1(.)Q−
 
The protocol can be described as follows: 
 
1. :A B→          ( || ) || (A a AQ ID N U X )
 
2. :B KDC→    ( || || [ || || ]) || ( )
bB b K A a b B A
Q ID N E ID N T U U X
 
3. :KDC A→    ( [ || || || ]) || [ || || ]) || ) || ( )
a bK B a s b K A s b b B A
Q E ID N K T E ID K T N U U X
 
4. :A B→           †( [ || || ]) || [ ]) || ( )
b sK A s b K b A A B
Q E ID K T E N U U U X
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Classical authentication protocol aided three-stage quantum protocol 
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1. A sends quantum information of the nonce  and the ID along side the message to B. aN
 
2. B also sends his ID and nonce and encrypts A’s ID, nonce and his timestamp using 
shared key between B and KDC. This initiates KDC to assign a session key. 
 
3. KDC assigns a session key and prepares packages for A and B which include their own 
ID, session key and B’s timestamp. A’s nonce is encrypted inside A’s package but B’s 
nonce is kept open. A gets back his nonce and A is assured of its timeliness by the 
session key and ensured that it’s not a replay. This block also verifies that B has 
received A’s earlier message with help of B’s ID. 
 
4.  Session key authenticates that the message came from A and is not a replay. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The difficulty of generating single photons makes Kak’s three-stage protocol more secure 
than other QKD protocols like BB84, which require use of single photons. Since all the 
photons, be it a single photon or multiple photons, go through private transformations in 
the Kak protocol, the information remains protected until the complex conjugate 
transformation is applied. In contrast, beam-splitting can easily break the inherent 
quantum security in BB84 and in order to avoid it measures may be taken that consume 
both time and money. Thus Kak’s three-stage protocol may be used with greater 
confidence in its unbreakability than BB84. 
 
Although Kak’s protocol is secure against beam-splitting it can be successfully subjected 
to man-in-the-middle attack. To deal with such an attack timestamps, IDs, session keys, 
nonces and encryption keys are used for verification. If the authentication process detects 
any problem, the process is aborted. In this protocol we are dependent on the KDC and 
we need the KDC to be trustworthy. 
 
There are many inherent advantages of the proposed system. The KDC can’t see the 
message in this system. Neither Bob nor Eve is capable of modifying or forging the 
message. Alice cannot disavow sending that message and simultaneously Bob cannot 
deny receiving the message later on. The transmission remains quantum and hence non-
reproducible. Synchronization throughout the network is not needed as the time-stamp is 
provided by Bob and hence will correspond to Bob’s clock only. Suppress-reply attacks 
can be avoided because the nonces, the recipients will choose, are unpredictable to the 
sender.  
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